The Behaviour of Betting and Currency Markets on the Night of the EU Referendum by Auld, T. & Linton, O.
                                                               
                                   
 
 
  
 
Cambridge-INET Working Paper Series No: 2017/22 
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics: 1750 
 
 
 
THE BEHAVIOUR OF BETTING AND CURRENCY MARKETS  
ON THE NIGHT OF THE EU REFERENDUM 
 
 
Tom Auld Oliver Linton 
(University of Cambridge) (University of Cambridge) 
 
 
 
 
 
We study the behaviour of the Betfair betting market and the sterling/dollar exchange rate (futures price) 
during 24 June 2016, the night of the EU referendum. We investigate how the two markets responded to 
the announcement of the voting results. We employ a Bayesian updating methodology to update prior 
opinion about the likelihood of the final outcome of the vote. We then relate the voting model to the real 
time evolution of the market determined prices. We find that although both markets appear to be 
inefficient in absorbing the new information contained in vote outcomes, the betting market is 
apparently less inefficient than the FX market. The different rates of convergence to fundamental value 
between the two markets leads to highly profitable arbitrage opportunities. 
Cambridge-INET Institute 
Faculty of Economics 
The behaviour of betting and
currency markets on the night of the
EU referendum∗
Tom Auld†, Oliver Linton
31 October, 2017
Faculty of Economics, University Of Cambridge, The Austin Robinson
Building, Sidgwick Ave, Cambridge, CB3 9DD, UK
Abstract
We study the behaviour of the Betfair betting market and the
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1 Introduction
Were currency and prediction markets efficient overnight on 24 June 2016 as
the results of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum
were announced?
This question is important as the EU referendum was one of the great
political shocks of 2016. The results of the vote itself provide for a unique
period in market history for which both financial and prediction market effi-
ciency can be studied. The night is a special event for a number of reasons.
Firstly, referendums are rare events with no similar votes in history for mar-
ket participants to base expectations1. There was also a strong prior belief
that the UK would vote to remain in the European Union. This provided fer-
tile ground for inefficiencies and behavioural biases to arise. Secondly, there
were 382 different voting areas that announced results at different times.
The results were immediately widely distributed during an overnight period
in which no other market relevant announcements were made. As such, the
sole determinant of prices (the area results) was well known and quantitative2
for a period of a few hours. Thirdly, there are 2 markets to study, a pre-
diction market in the Betfair betting market and the pound dollar currency
market.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) holds that financial markets im-
mediately reflect all available information in prices. If this is true, investors
cannot receive above market returns except by chance. The weakest form of
the hypothesis relates only to historical price information. Opinion is split
on whether this form holds. Stronger forms relating to both fundamental
(semi-strong) and private information (strong) also exist. Most studies con-
clude that the stronger forms of the EMH do not hold. For the night of the
EU referendum, one existing working paper concludes that the pound market
was slow to reflect the information contained in the vote results and hence
the EMH in the semi-strong form did not hold. Regarding prediction mar-
kets, there is a consensus in the literature that prediction markets provide
better estimates of future events than experts, and that the predictions of
such markets are useful in a variety of situations.
This paper makes a number of contributions: This is the first high fre-
1There have only been two other UK wide referendums. The first, the European
Communities membership referendum held in 1975, would be of little use for inferring
voting patterns today. The other, on an unrelated subject, was the Alternative Vote
Referendum in 2011 and had a turnout of only 42.2%, opposed to a typical figure of
60− 70% for general elections
2The percentage of those voting to leave the EU, as well as the percentage of those
from the eligible electorate who voted were released for each of the voting areas
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quency study in the literature comparing a prediction market with a financial
market. We agree with other work that concludes that the EMH in semi-
strong form did not hold in the currency market during the night of the
referendum, but we demonstrate this was also the case for a prediction mar-
ket. Further, we show that the Betfair market was more efficient than the
sterling market, which provides some support for the view that prediction
markets yield useful predictions. Small sample inference is required to pre-
dict Brexit early on in the night of the vote and we improve upon earlier
prediction methods by using a rigorous Bayesian approach that is valid for
small samples. Finally, we demonstrate that the different rates at which the
vote was reflected in the two markets led to arbitrage opportunities, implying
a failure of the EMH in the weak form.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. The next
section reviews the literature. Section 3 discusses the data we use. In Sec-
tion 4 we present the electoral model updating methodology, which employs
Bayesian Machine Learning. Section 5 presents a theoretical model linking
the behaviour of the two asset prices (Betfair contracts and Sterling futures)
under standard economic assumptions. In Section 6 we present our empirical
results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This is a study of market efficiency, and its manifestation in a prediction and
a financial market on the night of the EU referendum. We summarize the
debate concerning the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and refer to two
studies of referendums recently held in the UK. However a comprehensive
review of each field is beyond the scope of this paper. The reader is instead
referred to Horn et al. (2014) for a review of prediction markets and Graefe
(2016) for a specific review of political markets. There is a growing consen-
sus in the literature that political prediction markets are more accurate at
forecasting elections than are polls or experts.
The EMH (Fama (1965)) states that the prices of financial assets immedi-
ately discount all available information and therefore investors cannot make
above average returns, except by chance. There are various forms of the
hypothesis. In the Weak form, financial prices instantaneously discount all
market information; in the Semi-Strong form, prices instantaneously discount
all publicly available information; in the Strong form, prices instantaneously
discount all information both public and private, including privileged infor-
mation available to insiders. Many authors (eg Malkiel (2003)) argue that
the EMH does not imply that pricing is perfect or that mispricings never oc-
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cur, just that mispricings are random and it is not possible to systematically
profit from them in advance.
There are various behavioural explanations that attempt to explain why
the EMH may not hold. For a recent comprehensive review see Huang et al.
(2016). One such theory is that of investor inattention, which is potentially
relevant to us as results were announced outside of major market times. See
Hirshleifer et al. (2013), Hirshleifer et al. (2009) and Hou et al. (2009) for
examples, as well as DellaVigna & Pollet (2009) where the authors claim to
show that earnings announcements on a Friday take longer for the market to
react to. Other behavioural explanations include anchoring and systematic
overconfidence. Another idea presented in Caballero & Simsek (2016) pos-
tulates that a study of any anomalies of the EMH require an analysis of the
presence or absence of any arbitrage process that may exist to bring prices
rapidly back to the “correct” value. There have been many opinions and
studies published on the EMH and no consensus exists as to its validity. For
a recent review, see GabrielaTitan (2015).
There are many studies of betting markets and their ability to predict
future events including elections (Wolfers & Zitzewitz (2004)). A number
of studies have evaluated the efficiency of sports betting markets, mostly
finding some inefficiency (Goddard & Asimakopoulos (2004); Vlastakis et al.
(2009); Badarinathi & Kochman (1996)). There are relatively few studies
of referendums because they are unique events and require event-specific ap-
proaches. During the preparation of this paper a related study was published
(Wu et al. (2017)) which investigated the real time response of the exchange
rate to the announced vote outcomes. Their conclusion was that the “Brexit
result could have been predicted with high confidence under realistic condi-
tions”. Examining social and psychological factors as well as Betfair data
prior to the vote, the authors conclude that the mispricing “indicates both
generic inefficiency and a specific inertia / durable bias in the market similar
to herding during bubbles”. The paper also examines trading behaviour in
the pound around the announcement of specific results. We agree with the
conclusion of a mispricing in the pound market. However, there are some
shortcomings to the methodology. This concerns the use of OLS estimators
with small number of samples. These considerations are explored formally in
B. We improve upon this work by using a Bayesian electoral model valid for
small sample inference, by using real-time Betfair price data from the night
of the vote and introducing a theoretical model to relate the prices of the two
markets. One other study that uses political Betfair data is that Wall et al.
(2017). This study does not examine the efficiency of the betting market
but instead relies on the largely accepted premise that prediction markets
can provide meaningful forecasts of outcomes. Betfair data is used to control
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for polling shocks and isolate campaign event effects in the 2014 Scottish
Independence campaign in the months leading up to the referendum.
3 Data
The model uses the following data:
• EU Referendum Results: sourced from Electoral Commission (EC)
website (Electoral Commission (2016)).
• Timing Results: we use the earliest confirmed time for each voting area
from the three sources below:
– Press Association: the time, to the nearest second, that each result
was received and processed at the Association was used. This was
a small number of seconds after it was publicly announced at the
count.
– Electoral Commission: returning officers for each area both inform
the EC both just prior to announcement and immediately after-
wards. The EC has made both times for each area available to
us to the nearest second. This dataset provides a window within
which each area’s result must have been made public.
– Bloomberg: 67 of the 382 results were published in real time on
the Bloomberg terminal and the timestamps to the nearest second
have been retrieved. Although only a small subset of the total,
these results can be assumed to contain the most market-sensitive,
and hence most informative, information.
• Priors for each voting area: prior to the vote the psephologist, C. Han-
retty of Norwich University, published a blog titled “The EU referen-
dum: what to expect on the night” (Hanretty (2016)). Expectations
and 90% confidence intervals (CIs) for vote share based upon publicly
available data could be downloaded for all but 4 of the 382 voting ar-
eas3. The work was reported in the media, including on the popular
financial platform Bloomberg. It is reasonable to believe that market
participants were aware of this information and had ready access to it.
We do not reproduce this work, but we do to make use of it. The pri-
ors were based on a panel data analysis of the British Electoral Study
3Northern Ireland, the Isles of Scilly, Anglesey and Gibraltar were excluded due to the
lack of availability of local authority demographic data.
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(BES) from 2015 and demographic results at the local authority level.
Firstly the priors are calculated directly from the BES, and secondly,
a uniform swing is applied to each area to bring the results in line
with polling information available on the date of Hanretty’s publica-
tion (7 June). Various assumptions were used to generate the dataset.
Hanretty characterises them as follows:
– the geographic patterns of the Leave and Remain votes have re-
mained constant since May of [2015] (though the levels may have
changed)
– that undecideds will break in roughly even numbers between the
two camps
– Leave- and Remain-voting areas will vote at roughly equal rates.
• We make particular use of YouGov’s poll on the day (YouGov (2016)).
We also use other polls where there are gaps in Hanretty’s priors.
• Historical General Election Data: we make extensive use of constituency
level data for preceding general elections from the EC (Electoral Com-
mission (2017)) and the website Electoral Calculus (Baxter (2017)). We
also use historical polling information and measures of their accuracy
for general elections. This was obtained from Wikipedia (Wikipedia
(2017b)).
• GBPUSD Futures Price: we decided to use the GBPUSD future price
traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange rather than the spot price.
There are multiple exchanges where the spot trades and aggregation
could be prohibitively difficult. It is well known that spot and futures
prices for foreign exchange are extremely well correlated and are ef-
fectively contemporaneous on time scales of under one second. The
data was downloaded from Bloomberg and timestamps of trades were
reported to an accuracy of one second. Note that the futures con-
tract was closed between 10 pm and 11 pm on 23 June, but before the
announcement of results.
• Betfair Data: The betting website Betfair listed two contracts. These
were traded on Betfair’s exchange platform which acts as a limit order
book. The first paid out £1 in the event of Brexit, the other paid £1
in the event of Remain. The sum of the prices of the contracts did not
deviate sufficiently from £1 to enable a profitable arbitrage. Betfair
supplied all trades with timestamps of one second granularity in both
contracts between 10 pm on 23 June to 5 am on 24 June. We convert
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Figure 1: The Pound and Betfair Markets Overnight for the Period of the
Announcement of Results.
all prices in the Remain contract to a synthetic price in the Brexit one
by subtracting from £1. The resulting Betfair data set, along with the
GBPUSD future price, is shown in Figure 3. We conduct analysis on
the combined set of trades, which number 182,534. £51,016,907 in total
was matched during this 7 hour window. This compares with 88,246
trades in the GBP future during this time with a total notional traded
of around $5.5Bn.
4 Electoral Model
In this section we present a Bayesian model for calculating an implied prob-
ability of Brexit. The model updates as new area results are announced
throughout the night of the referendum. A summary of the model is pre-
sented in A.
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4.1 Setup
We have n constituencies with sizes s1, s2, . . . , sn ∈ N, ordered by time result.
Suppose pi,qi ∈ [0, 1] are the proportion of voters in favour of leaving the EU
and the turnout percentage in constituency i. Then the proportion of the
national vote is:
pN =
n∑
i=1
piqisi
and the event of leaving the EU occurs when:
pN >
1
2
4.2 Gaussian Copula Prior
In order to determine a real-time probability of Brexit we use a prior. This is
updated via Bayes’ rule as results arrive to give a distribution of unannounced
results conditional on announced results. The variables in the model are the
2n values of vote share and turnout of the vector r = (p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn)
⊺
.
Prior to the vote, Hanretty had effectively published marginal distributions
for the individual variables. The available data naturally leads us to take a
copula approach and this is how we will proceed.
Given CDFs for the unknown variables {Fr1(r1), . . . , Fr2n(r2n)}, the quan-
tiles of the variables are the values of the CDFs and are uniformly distributed.
Writing the quantiles as Xi = Fpi(pi) and Yi = Fqi(qi), the Copula defines
the dependence structure between the variables and is defined as:
C(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn) =
P (X1 < x1, . . . , Xn < xn, Y1 < y1, . . . , Yn < yn)
Sklar’s Theorem states that any multivariate distribution which has con-
tinuous marginals can be expressed in terms of a unique copula.
We model the dependence using the multivariate Gaussian copula over
[0, 1]2n .Writing the 2n quantiles of r as a vector z = (Fr1(r1), . . . , Fr2n(r2n))
⊺
and the correlation matrix Σ0, this is defined as:
CGaussΣ0 (z) = ΦΣ0(Φ
−1(z1), . . . , Φ−1(z2n)),
where ΦΣ is the CDF of a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean
and covariance matrix Σ. Φ (•) is the usual CDF of the N(0, 1) distribu-
tion. We model the dependence between the variables as a two-factor model,
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the factors being vote share and turnout, with correlations between factors
allowed, specifically
Σ0 =
(
Σp Σpq
ΣTpq Σq
)
,
where Σp is an n×n matrix describing the dependence of (p1, . . . , pn)
⊺
given
a correlation ρp and is
Σp = (1− ρp) In + (ρp) ini
⊺
n.
Similarly, Σp is the correlation matrix of (q1, . . . , qn)
⊺
given correlation ρq
and is
Σq = (1− ρq) In + (ρq) ini
⊺
n.
To model the correlation ρpq between turnout and vote share, the matrix Σpq
is defined as
Σpq = ρpq ×
[
(1− (ρqρp)) In + (ρqρp)ini
⊺
n
]
.
4.3 Prior Probability of Brexit
Given specifications for the dependency Σ0 and marginal distributions
{Fr1(r1), . . . , Fr2n(r2n)}
the prior probability of Brexit is
Pr(BREXIT )0 = Pr
(∑n
i=1 piqisi∑n
i=1 qisi
>
1
2
)
, (4.1)
where:
(p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn)
⊺
= r
Φ−1(F1(r1)), . . . , Φ−1(F2n(r2n)) ∼ N(0,Σ0).
As there is no analytical form for the integral in equation (4.1), a sampling
method is required for evaluation.
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4.4 Marginal Distributions
Hanretty provided expectations and 90% CIs for the marginals. These CIs are
implied by responses of the BES coupled with Local Authority demographic
data. They do not take into account the uncertainty of the national vote.
There may be an argument that the distributions that Hanretty supplies
as part of his econometric analysis of panel and local authority data are
asymptotically normal. No such argument can be made once the uncertainty
of the national vote share is taken into account. We interpret the prior as an
expression of a degree of belief about the possible values vote shares could
take. As such, we are not constrained by the normal distribution.
4.4.1 Marginal Calibration
To first calculate the expectations of the marginals, suppose µH is the vector
of expectations provided by Hanretty. Given an expected level for the na-
tional average vote share µN , then µp can be formed by applying a uniform
shift, αN × i, to µH where µH are Henretty’s expectations
4. Note that for
ρpq 6= 0, αN is not exactly equal to µP less the share implied by µH weighted
by νisi, as the national vote share is a sum of the pi weighted by qi which
are generally correlated5.
We present two ways of adjusting for the uncertainty of the marginal dis-
tributions. Firstly, we can assume that investors have rational expectations
and that the EMH holds. This leads us to set the overall level of variance so
as to produce a prior model probability equal to that in the Betfair market
prior to results being announced, which we label P0. Another approach is to
give up on the EMH and attempt a forecast by setting a level of variance of
pN , σ
2
p equal to a generous estimate of what we think it could be, σˆ
2
N . Either
way, we add a constant variance σ2N to each marginal variance and adjust σ
2
N
to achieve either result.
Firstly, we convert the CIs assuming a normal distribution as follows:
(σ2H)pi = ((90% Confidence Interval)i/(2× 1.645))
2,
where (σ2H)i is now the unadjusted variance implied for the i’th voting area.
The national vote share is uncertain and treating this variation as indepen-
dent of the idiosyncratic variances implied by Hanretty’s values leads us to
4Note, Henretty himself forms µ by applying a uniform shift to the priors he calculates
from the BIS and census data to agree with polling data at the time of his publication
5For instance if ρpq > 0, E(
∑
i
piqisi∑
i
qisi
) >
∑
i
µiνisi∑
i
νisi
since when pi is above its mean it will
tend to have a higher turnout and hence weight in the sum.
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add to each area variance a constant variance, say σ2N ,
6 whereby
σ2pi = (σ
2
H)i + σ
2
N
The prior mean for pN is below 50 so the part of the national vote share
distribution that lies above 50%, which is the model probability of Brexit,
will be greater given higher variance σ2N . Note that this calibration of σ
2
N
will have to be conducted only once the other prior parameters have been
chosen. For example a higher value of correlation between areas ρp will yield
a wider national vote share distribution and will thus require a smaller value
of σ2p for a given value of P0.
For turnout we base area level expectations, say ν, on historical general
elections. However we choose the variances for each area to be equal and
labelled by σ2ν .
We evaluate the model for different marginal distributions. We consider
the following:
4.4.2 Normal
ri ∼ N(µi, σ
2
i )
Fi(ri) = Φ
(
ri − µi
σi
)
This distribution is computationally cheap as it does not require the eval-
uation of the CDF or inverse. The prior is actually simply a multivariate
Gaussian. However, a disadvantage is that it does not restrict the random
variables pi,qi to [0, 1].
4.4.3 Logit Normal
logit(ri) ∼ N(µi, σ
2
i )
Fi(ri) = Φ
(
logit (ri)− µi
σi
)
6We are not implying that area vote shares are independent of the national vote share,
just that the idiosyncratic variation implied by Hanretty’s study of survey respondents
and local authority data is independent of the variation of the national vote share number.
Our assumptions are not even that strong; as we apply a uniform shift to variances we
are simply implying that the difference in the variations of the marginal distributions of
individual areas is the same as the difference implied by Hanretty’s study.
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We can apply the logit transform to the variables to convert them to the
real line, and then assume a normal distribution under that transformation.
Again, a multivariate normal distribution is implied for the transformed vari-
ables. As there is no analytic solution to the moments a sampling method
could be used. However, we will use a simple transformation which was found
in practice to make no difference to the results as follows:
µi = logit
−1(µi)
σi =
[logit (µi + σi)− logit (µi − σi)]
2
Note that as the logit function is only symmetric around the value 0.5, the
above transformations will not (quite) preserve the differences in expected
values of vote share. However, in practice the differences were not found to
be meaningful.
4.4.4 Beta
ri ∼ Beta(αi, βi)
Fi(ri) = Iri(αi, βi) =
∫ ri
0
tαi−1 (1− t)βi−1 dt
The Beta distribution is restricted to [0, 1] and is parameterized by two
shape parameters α and β. For a mean of µi and variance of σ
2
i , the shape
parameters will be equal to:
αi =
(
1− µi
σ2i
−
1
µi
)
µ2i
βi = αi
(
1
µi
− 1
)
4.4.5 Logit Student with Location and Scale
logit(ri) ∼ tν(µi, σ
2
i )
Fi(ri) =
1
2
+
(
logit(ri)−µi
σi
)
Γ
(
ν+1
2
)
×
2F1( 12 ,
ν+1
2
, 3
2
,−(logit(ri)−µi)2/(σ2i×ν))√
π×νΓ( ν2 )
The Student’s t-distribution has a higher kurtosis than the normal dis-
tribution and including it enables us to study priors with greater fourth
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moments for a given variance. The mean is simply µ whereas the variance,
for ν > 2, is ν
ν−2 × σ. We set the parameters in a similar way to the logit
normal marginal, but with scale parameter σi
σi =
ν − 2
ν
×
[logit (µi + σi)− logit (µi − σi)]
2
The excess kurtosis is ∞ for ν ∈ (2, 4] and 6
ν−4 for ν > 4. To explore the
implications of infinite fourth moments (for logit(ri) not ri) we set ν = 3.
4.5 Update
Calculation of the conditional distribution is most easily done by a re-ordering
of the variables:
r˜ = (p1, q1, . . . , pn, qn)
⊺
.
Then
Φ−1(F˜1(r˜1)), . . . , Φ−1(F˜2n(r˜2n)) ∼ N(0, Σ˜0),
where x˜ indicates a similar re-ordering of rows and columns of x. To calculate
the conditional distribution of the remaining variables after m results have
been announced, partition Σ˜0 into four block matrices as follows:
Σ˜0 =
(
Σ˜m,m Σ˜m,\m
Σ˜\m,m Σ˜\m,\m
)
,
where: Σ˜m,m, Σ˜m,\m, Σ˜\m,m and Σ˜\m,\m, are 2m × 2m, 2m × 2(n − m),
2(n −m) × 2m and 2(n−m)× 2(n−m) matrices respectively. The multi-
variate Gaussian copula provides a simple update of the conditional distri-
bution to yield another Gaussian copula as follows. Given the observations
p1, q1, . . . , pm, qm, write
x˜m =
(
F˜1(r˜1)), . . . , Φ
−1(F˜2m(r˜2m)
)
.
Then
Φ−1(F˜2m+1(r˜2m+1)), . . . , Φ−1(F˜2n(r˜2n)) | r˜m ∼ N(Π˜\m, Σ˜\m),
which is a Gaussian copula with non-zero mean Π˜/m and covariance matrix
Σ˜/m given by:
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Π˜\m = Σ˜\m,mΣ˜−1m,mx˜m
Σ˜\m = Σ˜\m,\m − Σ˜\m,mΣ˜−1m,mΣ˜m,\m
As p1, . . . , pr, q1, . . . , qr is now known, the model probability of Brexit can be
computed by simulation via:
Pr(BREXIT)m = P
(∑
i>m piqisi∑
i qisi
>
1
2
−
∑
i≤m piqisi∑
i qisi
)
.
An advantage of the model is that it provides for closed form updates to
the posterior distributions of the parameters, as the Gaussian copula has a
conditional distribution. This avoids the need for a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo sampling technique to calculate the integral in equation (4.1). This
would be particularly arduous given the large number (2× 382) of variables
involved. An alternative copula, with well understand and closed form con-
ditional distributions, is the Student’s t copula Ding (2016). The conditional
distribution is also a Student’s t copula and will have fatter joint tails from
the Gaussian. It would be interesting to see if there were any effects of the
speed of convergence by changing to a t copula, but such a study is beyond
the scope of this work. We note, however, that our framework does at least
allow for higher kurtosis distributions in the national vote pN through the
use of the logit Student’s t distribution with degrees of freedom above but
close to 2. Another potential avenue for future exploration would be to use
a marginal distribution with a low kurtosis. A Generalized Normal Distri-
bution with a β parameter of between 3 and 8, for instance, would be an
excellent candidate.
We now comment on the expected qualitative impact of the model as
parameters change. For purely independent vote share results (ρp, ρq = 0),
convergence will solely be due to the results as they come in and the distri-
butions of the yet to be announced results will not be affected. For higher
values of ρp, convergence will be faster. It is expected that the value of
ρp and the variance σ
2
N will have the greatest effect on the speed at which
predictions change. The effect of ρq and ρpq on the model probability are
effectively second order. Given that we will be setting ρpq as negative and
turnout was above expectations, there will be some small second order effects
from changes in the other parameters. Lowering ν or σ2v will slow the speed
of convergence whereas lower ρq and lower |ρpq| will speed convergence, but
these effects should be very small.
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4.6 Parameter Choices
In an ideal hypothetical world we would have a sequence of Brexit referen-
dums on which we could fit the covariance structure of the results Σ0 using a
method such as Maximum Likelihood or Feasible Generalized Least Squares.
Unfortunately, we have no such data. We rely instead on general elections
and polling data to chose plausible parameter values. We attempt to rely
only on information available in the public domain prior to the announcement
of results and will do our best to avoid any hindsight bias in the analysis.
4.6.1 Turnout
National Turnout There were reports of high turnout on the day of the
vote itself (Gutteridge (2016)). We will use national turnout for general
elections as a guide, but note that the Scottish independence referendum
had an unprecedentedly high turnout of 85%. The general election turnout
figures since 1945 are shown in Table 4.6.1. The average is 66.9% (6.7%)
and for the last three elections the average is 64.2%. We use 67.6% which is
the three-election average weighted upwards by half the six-election standard
deviation. A reasonable range of expectations would be 65− 70%.
Area Turnout Voting regions for the EU referendum were not the same
as the constituencies used for general elections. However, the EC categorizes
both the 381 voting areas in the referendum (excluding Gibraltar) and the
(most recently 650) general election constituencies by 12 region codes. This
enables us to make a more granular estimate of turnout per area vi than
simply assuming a uniform expectation. We use average turnout for each
region for the 2010 and 2015 general elections as outlined in Table 4.6.1.
Similar to the means of the expected vote share per region, (ν1, . . . , νn) can
be uniformly shifted to achieve the required expected national turnout.
Turnout Variance Instead of setting turnout variance by region we will
simply use the same level for every area and use the standard deviation figure
for the last six general election 6.7%.
4.6.2 Turnout Correlation by Area
Given elections in time periods t = 1, . . . , T and turnouts qit, if we have
predictions in advance for qit, q¯it then we can model the prediction errors
△qit = qit− q¯it as being due to a national error ǫt and individual error terms,
ηit where
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Election Year England Wales Scotland N. Ireland UK
2015 65.8% 65.7% 71.1% 58.1% 66.1%
2010 65.5% 64.7% 63.8% 57.6% 65.1%
2005 61.3% 62.6% 60.8% 62.9% 61.4%
2001 59.2% 61.6% 58.2% 68% 59.4%
1997 71.4% 73.5% 71.3% 67.1% 71.4%
1992 78% 79.7% 75.5% 69.8% 77.7%
Standard Deviation UK, 1992 - 2015 6.7%
1987 75.4% 78.9% 75.1% 67% 75.3%
1983 72.5% 76.1% 72.7% 72.9% 72.7%
1979 75.9% 79.4% 76.8% 67.7% 76%
1974 Feb 79% 80% 79% 69.9% 78.8%
1974 Oct 72.6% 76.6% 74.8% 67.7% 72.8%
1970 71.4% 77.4% 74.1% 76.6% 72%
1966 75.9% 79% 76% 66.1% 75.8%
1964 77% 80.1% 77.6% 71.7% 77.1%
1959 78.9% 82.6% 78.1% 65.9% 78.7%
1955 76.9% 79.6% 75.1% 74.1% 76.8%
1951 82.7% 84.4% 81.2% 79.9% 82.6%
1950 84.4% 84.8% 80.9% 77.4% 83.9%
1945 73.4% 75.7% 69% 67.4% 72.8%
Table 1: Historical UK General Election Turnout.
Region 2015 Turnout 2010 Turnout Average Turnout
East 67.5% 67.6% 67.6%
East Midlands 66.5% 66.8% 66.6%
London 65.4% 64.5% 64.9%
North East 61.8% 61.1% 61.4%
North West 64.3% 62.3% 63.3%
Northern Ireland 58.1% 57.6% 57.8%
Scotland 71.0% 63.8% 67.4%
South East 68.6% 68.2% 68.4%
South West 69.5% 69.0% 69.2%
Wales 65.7% 64.8% 65.2%
West Midlands 64.1% 64.7% 64.4%
Yorkshire and The Humber 63.3% 62.9% 63.1%
Table 2: Turnout per EC Region in 2010 and 2015.
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△qit = ǫit + ηt
ǫit ∼ N(0, σ
2
ǫ )
ηt ∼ N(0, σ
2
η)
COV(ǫt, ηit) = 0
Then for i 6= j, ρq is given by:
ρq = Corr(△qit,△qjt) =
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2
ǫ
i 6= j
A regression of 2015 constituency turnout on 2010 turnout yields a co-
efficient of determination of 0.734 which provides evidence for simply using
the turnout of the last election as the prediction. We do so. σ2η is simply
the variance of the national turnout (6.7%). σ2ǫ requires looking at errors at
the constituency level for each separate election. As there was the fifth con-
stituency boundary review in 2008 we can form no easy prediction for area
turnout for the 2010 election because constituencies changed. We simply
use the 2015 election to estimate σ2η with predictions provided by the 2010
election. This results in a estimate7 of 3.0% for σǫ and one for ρq of 0.835. In
the absence of any other estimate or information pertinent to likely voting
habits, this is what we use.
4.7 Vote Share
4.7.1 Area Vote Share
An expected national vote share µN is required to calculate the means µ of
the marginal distributions in the prior. In the days and weeks before the
referendum, various opinion polls were published. We use polls to calculate
this expectation. Polls with samples in the week preceding the referendum
are shown in Table 4.7.1, along with seven polls of polls. For general elections,
exit polls measure how people declare they have voted on the day itself at a
selection of particular, secret, polling stations. They are much more accurate
than any pre-election polling (Curtice et al. (2011)), due to the fact that there
is no measurement error of respondents and a diff-in-diff estimate is used
based on the sample from the preceding election. There was no exit poll for
the referendum as it was a one-off election. There was, however, a poll on the
day conducted by YouGov which was published shortly after voting closed
7Estimates based on sample moments are consistent due to the Law of Large Numbers.
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Date(s) Remain Leave Undecided Remain Lead Organisation
22-Jun 55% 45% -- 10% Populus
20–22 Jun 51% 49% -- 2% YouGov
20–22 Jun 49% 46% 1% 3% Ipsos MORI
20–22 Jun 44% 45% 9% 1% Opinium
17–22 Jun 54% 46% -- 8% ComRes
17–22 Jun 48% 42% 11% 6% ComRes
16–22 Jun 41% 43% 16% 2% TNS
20-Jun 45% 44% 11% 1% Survation/IG Group
18–19 Jun 42% 44% 13% 2% YouGov
16–19 Jun 53% 46% 2% 7% ORB/Telegraph
17–18 Jun 45% 42% 13% 3% Survation
Polls of Polls
23-Jun 52% 48% -- 4% What UK Thinks: EU
23-Jun 50.6% 49.4% -- 1.2% Elections Etc.
23-Jun 45.8% 45.3% 9% 0.5% HuffPost Pollster
22-Jun 46% 44% 10% 2% Number Cruncher Politics
23-Jun 48% 46% 6% 2% Financial Times
22-Jun 51% 49% -- 2% The Telegraph
23-Jun 44% 44% 9% 0% The Economist
2.0% Average Poll of Polls
Table 3: Opinion Polling Prior to the EU Referendum. Source Wikipedia
(2017a).
at 10 pm YouGov (2016). This poll measured how people voted versus how
those same individuals reported their voting intention the preceding day. The
result was a demographically weighted result of 48.38%. This was broadly
in line with recent polls. As we consider this the most accurate poll we set
48.38%.
4.7.2 Variance of Area Vote Share
Variances are chosen by shifting those implied by Hanretty by a constant
amount σ2N so that either the model probability agrees with the Betfair im-
plied probability P0 or σ
2
p is set so as to imply a generous estimate σˆ
2
p:
• For P0 calibration: Between the release of the on the day poll and
the first result there were known trades in the spread betting markets
with implied probabilities between 10.7% and 37.5%. The average was
18
Election Average Poll (Prior Week) Result Error
2015 34% 37.8% -3.80%
2010 35% 36.9% -1.58%
2005 31% 33.2% -2.20%
2001 31% 31.7% -0.92%
1997 30% 30.7% -0.27%
1992 37% 41.9% -4.46%
σˆǫ 2.66%
Table 4: Opinion Polls and Vote Share for the Conservatives for recent gen-
eral elections.
25.1% (7.1%). We use 25% but note that values in (18%, 32%) would
be reasonable (the mean ± the standard deviation). Note that these
probabilities are broadly in line with the predictions of the Almanis
prediction market (19) and Dr Tetlock’s Good Judgment project (25%).
• For σ2p calibration: Figure 4.7.2 shows that the average error in opinion
polls from the prior week in the last six general elections was 2.66%.
General election polling is a well-researched field with plenty of histor-
ical precedent and would probably be too confident a figure. As our
aim is to produce a prediction based on a conservative prior, we will
set σp = 5%.
4.7.3 Correlation between Voting Areas
We analyse general election data in a similar manner to section 4.6.2 to es-
timate ρp. The generally pro-Brexit Conservative party vote share is used
as a proxy for the Brexit vote. Predictions for that vote at the constituency
level are based on applying the implied swing from opinion polls from the
week prior to each election, to the level of the last election. See Table 4.7.2
for these polling results and for the results of the last six elections. Com-
plications arise due to Westminster constituency boundary reviews in 1995,
2005 and 2008. These reviews change the number of constituencies and their
composition of voters. They occur periodically in order to remove variations
in the number of electors in each area, and have tended to favour the Con-
servatives (Rallings et al. (2008)). This is a well understood problem and the
website Electoral Calculus (Baxter (2017)) publishes implied election results
for elections preceding a review to enable ready comparison; we use these
implied figures.
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The implied standard error of ση using the data in Table 4.7.2 is 2.66%
8.
Relying on the last six elections, the constituency level error calculation yields
an estimate of 4.18% for σǫ, implying a correlation ρp = 0.288. However, our
constituency level errors are probably estimated at too high a level as better
predictions for constituency level results exist although we do not have ready
access to them. For this reason, the value of σ2η is probably estimated at too
high a level and ρp too low. Consequently, this value of ρp will be treated as
a lower bound.
The correlation ρp is likely to be the parameter with the largest effect
on how quickly the model prediction will converge to the true result. It
is therefore worth commenting that the implied correlation coefficient, as
estimated, appears to be stable. Using only the last three elections results
in an estimate of 0.324. The largest estimated value of σǫ (5.69%) in any
single election for the last six was in 1997, which was (unsurprisingly) also
the largest error in the national vote share. If we combine this ση = 2.66%,
the ρp = 0.18. This is an artificially low estimate and parameter values below
this level are highly unlikely.
4.8 Correlation between Vote and Turnout
There were conflicting reports concerning the probable impact of turnout,
even within the same newspaper on the day of the result (Gutteridge (2016),
Foster (2016)).
Predicting how unexpected turnout affects results requires a successful
prediction of whether the difference in turnout is attributed to Leave or
Remain supporters. This is a difficult problem. It was well understood
in advance that younger voters, who are less likely to vote, would favour
Remain, and that Brexit supporters were reported in surveys being more
than twice as likely to vote as Remain ones Twyman (2016). YouGov were
widely quoted as suggesting the relationship between turnout and Brexit vote
share would be negative (see Foster (2016) for an example).
We again take a quantitative approach by examining general elections.
Due to boundary changes we are restricted to studying only the 2015 general
election as no implied turnouts for elections preceding a boundary review is
available. We proxy support for Brexit at the 2015 general election by using
combined vote shares of UKIP and the Conservatives (the parties with sup-
porters most sympathetic to Brexit). We regress the swing of the combined
UKIP and Conservatives vote share against the change in turnout at the
8As the model implicitly assumes a mean of zero this is the square root of the average
of the squares of the error, not the sample variance.
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Figure 2: Change in UKIP + Conservative Vote Share versus Change in
Constituency Turnout at the 2015 General Election.
constituency level for the 2010-2015 elections. Figure 2 shows the regression,
which results in a statistically significant correlation coefficient of −0.361.
This is indeed negative, agreeing with YouGov, and we use this value.
4.9 A Note on Model Correlation and Measured Cor-
relation
The model correlation parameters ρp, ρq and ρpq are not strictly the correla-
tions of the random variables r = (r1, . . . , r2n). They are the correlations of
Φ−1 of the quantiles or:
(
Φ−1(F1(r1)), . . . , Φ−1(F2n(r2n))
)
.
When the marginal is normal, Φ−1(Fi(ri)) will be a linear function of ri
correlations will be identical. When Φ−1(Fi(•)) is non-linear, a simulation
or other method would be strictly required to convert them. However, we
omit this step as we do not expect it to be significant. As we shall see,
moving away from the Gaussian marginals does not change the behaviour of
the model greatly.
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Parameter Description Value Range
ν National Turnout 67.6 65− 70%
σν Turnout Error (6.7%)
2
–
ρq Area Turnout Correlation 0.835 –
µN Expected National Vote Share 48.38 –
P0 Prior Expectation of Brexit 25% 18− 32%
σp National Vote Error 5% –
ρp Area Vote Correlation ≥ 0.288 ≥ 0.18
ρpq Area Vote and Turnout Correlation −0.361 –
Table 5: Plausible parameter values.
4.10 Missing Priors
Of the 382 voting areas of the Referendum, Hanretty failed to publish priors
for four areas. These are listed in Table 4.10. The 4 areas are:
1. Gibraltar: This makes up a tiny 0.05% of the electorate, was the first
area to announce, and had overwhelming support for Remain (Reyes
(2016b,a)). As the population is so distinct from that of the rest of the
UK, the result is not informative. We therefore take it as given and do
not include it in the model.
2. The Isles of Scilly and Isle of Anglesey make up only 0.11% of the
electorate and are simply ignored.
3. Northern Ireland consists of about 1.26m voters in a total electorate
of roughly 46.5m. We use opinion polls for the mean and a standard
deviation equal to that of the average of the other areas. We use a
poll published on June 20 (Shapiro (2016)) that showed Remain 11%
ahead, or 9% higher than the rest of the UK at that time. We therefore
set the mean equal to µN − 9%.
Area Declaration (Actual / Expected) Electorate (%)
Gibraltar 23:36:33 / 00:01 24,119 (0.05%)
Isles of Scilly 00:49:42 / 00:01 1,799 (0.004%)
Isle of Anglesey 02:18:00 / 02:30 51,445 (0.11%)
Northern Ireland 04:37:00 / 04:00 1,260,955 (2.71%)
Table 6: The 4 Voting Areas with Missing Priors. Source Hanretty (2016).
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5 Theoretical Model
In this section we present a simple model of how the markets could behave
overnight according to basic economic theory.
5.1 Assumptions
The assumptions of the model are labeled as follows:
NS No shocks to the GBPUSD price beyond those that affect the
probability of Brexit
ID Identical beliefs in the GBPUSD and Betfair markets
EMHW The Efficient Market Hypothesis holds in the weak form
EMHSS The Efficient Market Hypothesis holds in the semi-strong form
CMI Conditional Mean Independence of GBPUSD price given Brexit
RN Risk Neutrality
Not all these assumptions are regarded as holding exactly but they are pre-
sented as an approximation. We discuss each one in detail below.
NS The assumption of no external shocks beyond those affecting the
likelihood of Brexit would not be expected to hold over longer
time scales, but for the period under study its validity is reason-
able. Indeed, the authors of Wu et al. (2017) describe the circum-
stances as “a natural experiment” with “near perfect conditions”
to study such a situation. There were no other major economic
releases, or significant news events (beyond Brexit). In advance,
the Econoday Economic Calendar (Econoday (2016)) listed the
final market moving news releases on the 23 June as the US New
Home Sales Report at 10:00 am Eastern Time (ET) and the first
one for 24 June (beyond the referendum) as Durable Goods Or-
ders at 10 am ET. They predicted that the following would be
the market focus for the 24th: “In a rare and potentially power-
ful wildcard, the markets will react to the Brexit outcome”. This
demonstrates that in advance there were beliefs that the main
determinant of prices would be the outcome of the Referendum.
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ID When market participants are allowed to have heterogeneous be-
liefs, the idea of a “market implied probability” has no definition.
In fact, even under RN, the price of a Betfair contract paying out
£1 in the event of Brexit does not even equal the budget weighted
mean belief of participants9. This assumption states that under
heterogeneous beliefs both the Betfair and the financial market
have the same distributions.
EMHW When the EMH holds there can be an interpretation of a market
probability for a prediction market, as all information has been
aggregated into the price. The market price of the Betfair con-
tract can be interpreted as u−1(Pbetfair × u(£1)), where u(•) is
the Bernoulli utility function and Pbetfair is the market implied
probability. Correspondingly, Pbetfair = u(BETP )/u(£1) where
BETP is the price. Note that EMHW ⇒ ID.
EMHSS EMH holding in the semi-strong form will imply that prices im-
mediately discount all publicly available information including
any results of voting areas already announced in the referen-
dum. As a solution concept, the semi-strong form will imply
that Pbetfair will equal the electoral model probability at all times.
Note that EMHSS ⇒ EMHW ⇒ ID.
CMI Prior to the vote there were several predictions that the pound
would sell off significantly in the event of Brexit but rally a little
otherwise (see Wu et al. (2017)). Let
D =
{
1 BREXIT at time T
0 REMAIN at time T
The CMI assumption can be written mathematically as:
Et(GBPT |D, pN) = Et(GBPT |D),
where pN is the national share of those voting for Brexit, while
T is the time when the decision is announced and t is any time
with t < T . Equivalently, the sterling rate is affected by pN only
through its affect on whether Brexit occurs. The GBPUSD price
would be expected to be the same if the vote for Brexit were either
50.01% or 99.99%. This is a strong assumption, particularly when
9C. Manski argued in 2004 (Manski (2004)) that as the market price is the price at
which net buyers must equal net sellers then the mean belief will lie in an interval whose
midpoint is the market price P but with width 2P (1− P ) (assuming RN).
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there is significant probability mass around outcomes very close
pN = 50%.
RN Again, this is a strong assumption which is not believed to hold
in practice, but it is a useful approximation that is likely to be
roughly valid. However, it is noted that any deviations from RN
may have larger effects than they otherwise might have due to
the increased risk of holding the pound during the period under
study10.
5.2 Model
We rely on all the assumptions of the model except EMHSS. These imply
that for the currency price GBPt and for the Betfair Contract Price, BETPt,
which pays out £1 in the event of Brexit,
GBPt = Et (GBPT )
= Et (GBPT |D, pN )
= Et (GBPT |D)
= Pr (D = 1|Ft)Et (GBPT |D = 1)
+ Pr (D = 0|Ft)Et (GBPT |D = 0)
= Pr (D = 1|Ft) (Et (GBPT |D = 1)− Et (GBPT |D = 0))
+ Et (GBPT |D = 0)
BETPt = Et (BETPT )
= Pr (D = 1|Ft)× £1
= Pr (D = 1|Ft) .
Therefore,
GBPt = BETPt × (Et (GBPT |D = 1)− Et (GBPT |D = 0))
+ Et(GBPT |D = 1).
5.3 Implications
The assumptions of the model imply that the two markets should move
together tick by tick. We can relax the assumption of no external shocks to
10Higher perceptions of risk were evident from, for instance, higher implied volatility
from options pricing as well as increased margin requirements from brokers for sterling
related products.
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prices beyond Brexit by assuming that there are shocks but that they do not
persist (are stationary) and are not serially correlated.
Write GBPH =Et (GBPT |D = 0), GBPL =Et (GBPT |D = 1) and
△GBP = △GBPH − △GBPL and assume that these are constants, i.e.,
independent of t. Prices at time t will thus satisfy:
GBPt = GBPL + (1− BETPt)× (GBPH −GBPL) + ǫt
= GBPL + (1− BETPt)× (△GBP ) + ǫt,
where ǫt is a martingale difference. Thus the two markets will be cointegrated
with cointegrating vector (△GBP,−1). The presence of serial correlation in
deviations from the cointegrating vector ǫt would imply that markets were
informationally inefficient, violating the EMHW.
The stronger assumption of EMHSS implies that:
GBPt = GBPL + Pr(D = 0|Ft)× (△GBP ) + ǫt (5.1)
BETPt = Pr(D = 1|Ft),
where Pr(D = 0|Ft) is the model probability of Remain and is correctly eval-
uated given all available information. Taking △GBP as given, an arbitrage
opportunity may exist if the error term deviates from zero. This would be fa-
cilitated by taking a position in the Betfair contract and taking an opposing
position in the pound, in the ratio of the cointegrating vector.
5.4 Relaxation of assumptions
Relaxing RN will imply that
GBPt = u
−1 (u (GBPL) + u−1 (1− BETPt)× u ((GBPH −GBPL)))
where u(•) is the utility function. When we relax CMI we can still assume
that the GBPUSD price will decrease with the vote share pN . Thus GBPt is
will now be a non-linear but monotonic function of (1 − BETp). Therefore,
only NS and ID are required to imply that the pound price should be mov-
ing contemporaneously with some non-linear but monotonic function of the
Betfair price.
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6 Results
6.1 Electoral Probability Model
We used Matlab to generate results, sampling from the relevant multivari-
ate distributions to evaluate model probabilities. Where calibration was re-
quired, we found that a simple gradient descent was adequate.
6.1.1 Forecast Model
Figure 6.1 shows the results for calibrating the model prior to the generous
standard deviation figure of 5% using the parameters from Table 4.8. The
kurtosis of the distributions is lower for the normal model, due to the logit
mapping squeezing the distribution. The logit t-distribution has higher kur-
tosis, as expected. Both logit distributions are highly significantly different
to the normal distribution, as shown by the Jarque-Bera (JB) test pValue.
All marginals had a very generous prior 90% confidence interval of around
16.5% width. Figure 6.1 shows the evolution of the model forecast as the
night progressed. The results of all marginals are almost identical except for
the higher kurtosis logit-t marginal, which had a surprisingly quicker rate
of convergence. The logit-t model predicted Brexit at 1:32am on the 13th
result with 95% accuracy, and on the 19th result at 1:45am with 99% accu-
racy. The other models took until 1:44:56am (16th result) and 2:05am (34th
result) to get to those certainties respectively. This compares with the BBC
projecting Brexit at 4:39:32am11. The Betfair market took until 04:21:00 am
to imply 99% probability, and the pound took even longer to react. This is
considered a successful prediction which violates EMHSS.
6.1.2 Robustness to Parameter Changes
Table 7 shows the figures when making parameters more conservative by
roughly 5%. This involves lowering ν, lowering σν , increasing the magnitude
of ρpq, increasing ρq, decreasing ρp and increasing the initial variance σp.
Changing only σp and ρp on their own changes the speed of convergence a
little. Lowering ρp further to the very conservative lower bound of 0.18 slows
the result significantly but still predicts Brexit with 99% probability about an
hour and a half before the Betfair market. This suggests that our conclusions
are robust to parameter changes. Only changes to σp and ρp meaningfully
affect the model, as expected.
11According to our Bloomberg scrape.
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Forecast Model Prior
Marginal Kurtosis 90% CI 99% CI JB p
Normal 3.0 (40.1%, 56.7%) (35.4%, 61.4%) > 0.5
Logit Normal 2.9 (40.2%, 56.6%) (35.9%, 60.1%) < 0.001
Beta 3.0 (40%, 56.6%) (35.5%, 61.3%) 0.29
Logit t 3.6 (40%, 56.6%) (34.4%, 62.4%) > 0.5
95% result 99% result
16 (1:44:57) 34 (2:05:00)
16 (1:44:57) 34 (2:05:00)
16 (1:44:57) 34 (2:05:00)
13 (1:32:00) 19 (1:45:00)
Figure 3: Prior Distributions for Forecast Model.
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Forecast Model Path
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Figure 4: National Vote Distribution Evolution (Logit Normal) and Model
Probability Paths for Forecast Model.
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Result σP ρp ρq ρpq ν σν 95% result
a
1 b 5% 0.288 0.877 −0.379 64.2% 6.4% 16 (1:44:57)
2 c 5% 0.274 0.835 −0.361 67.6% 6.7% 16 (1:44:57)
3 d 5.3% 0.288 0.835 −0.361 67.6% 6.7% 17 (1:45:00)∗
4 e 5% 0.18 0.835 −0.361 67.6% 6.7% 35 (2:05:00)∗
a*Indicates a change from initial values
bResult 1 changes all parameters except ρp and σp.
cResult 2 changes ρp only.
dResult 3 changes σp only.
eResult 4 sets ρp at the lower limit of our plausible range, 0.18.
Table 7: How the Times to Predict Brexit Vary with More Conservative
Parameter Values (Normal Marginal).
6.1.3 Other Parameter Values
Next we turn to the question of how the model evolves when calibrating to
the initial Betfair probability. Results are shown in Figure 6.1.3. The models
converge exceptionally quickly, with all of them predicting Brexit with 99%
confidence by the 12th result at 1:23:34. Calibration to P0 = 25% yields
an initial standard deviation of 2.4% (2.7% for logit). This is lower than
recent general election polling errors and may indicate that the market was
irrationally overconfident. To answer the question of what prior the market
expresses, we lower ρp while setting the variance so as to fix P0 to market,
and fixing the other parameter values. This is justified, as the preceding
section demonstrated that ρp is the main determinant of model behaviour
after σp has been fixed. Figure 6.1.3 shows the results and suggests that a
model roughly consistent with the Betfair market would necessitate a ρp of
around 0.02. This is simply implausible. There is no hope for the pound
market where a value of ρp ∈ (0, 0.01) appears to be required. We conclude
that the market could not have behaved consistently for any reasonable prior
belief.
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Calibration to Betfair Market
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Marginal Stdev Kurtosis 90% Interval 99% Interval JB p
Normal 2.40% 3.0 44.5%, 52.3% 42.3%, 54.5% 0.404
Logit Normal 2.40% 3.0 44.5%, 52.3% 42.3%, 54.5% 0.012
Beta 2.40% 3.0 44.4%, 52.3% 42.2%, 54.6% 0.264
Logit t 2.70% 4.2 44.1%, 52.7% 40.7%, 56.0% <0.001
95% result 99% result
10 (1:15:00) 11 (1:17:00)
10 (1:15:00) 12 (1:23:34)
10 (1:15:00) 11 (1:17:00)
10 (1:15:00) 12 (1:23:34)
Figure 5: Results when Calibrating Initial Model Probability to Betfair Mar-
ket with the Statistics of the Calibrated Model Priors and Prediction Times.
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Figure 6: Model Probability Paths when Lowering ρp.
6.2 Behaviour of Markets and Arbitrage Opportunity
The evolution of the two markets on the night is shown in Figure 7. We
calculate the cointegrating ratio by evaluating both markets at the beginning
and end of the 7 hour period from 10 pm on 23 June to 5 am on 24 June.
Following the notation of equation 5.1, this gives implied values of GBPL =
1.345, GBPH = 1.499 and △GBP = 0.154. This is similar to the predictions
made of the pound conditional on the outcome of the referendum made by
various commentators in advance (see Wu et al. (2017)).
The cointegration error ǫt = GBPt − (1 − BetP )×△GBP is plotted in
Figure 8 along with the sample Auto-Correlation Function (ACF) in Figure
9. Note that the error is the return of the portfolio generated by buying £1
and selling △GBP Betfair Brexit contracts. Testing the Null of stationarity
of the error with the KPSS test results in rejection with a pValue of <
0.0112. This is a formal rejection of the theoretical model presented in section
12Testing a null hypothesis of a unit root via an augmented Dickey Fuller test using
the saturate and reject method of lag selection results in non-rejection of the null with a
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Figure 7: Last Prices by Minute.
5. There is a limit to what can be achieved from a statistical test of a
time series spanning eight hours where there appears to be a very strong
lead/lag relationship of the order of 2 hours between the two components.
The ACF appears to exhibit non-stationary persistence. The most convincing
explanation for the rejection of stationarity of the error and the shape of the
ACF is that the referendum shocks were first felt in the betting market and
later in the currency market. This is shown in Figure 10 which graphs implied
probabilities of the forecast model and the markets. (The RN and the CMI
assumptions are required to imply these market probabilities). The forecast
model leads the Betfair price, which in turn leads the pound probability.
The average horizontal distance on this plot between the relevant lines is 113
minutes for forecast-Betfair and 185 for forecast-pound. It appears that the
fundamental information (forecast) led the betting market by nearly 2 hours
which in turn led the pound by over an additional hour.
Relaxing the CMI, RN and EMHSS assumptions made in section 5 but
still relying on NS, implies that the markets move contemporaneously, ac-
pValue of 0.168. This provides further evidence of non-stationarity.
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Figure 8: The Theoretical Cointegration Error.
cording to some possibly non-linear but monotonic function of price. What
would need to be assumed for the EMHW to actually hold? One would have
to believe that there was a shock to the pound that caused a change in price
of 9 cents, or around 7%, which was independent of the referendum results
and which was subsequently reversed around 2 hours later, at around the
time that Brexit became apparent. This is not plausible.
If we do not reject the null of stationarity, then the ACF suggests that the
error term, that is, the return of the portfolio, is highly serially correlated.
This could be formally tested. However, given the shape of the ACF and the
evolution of the prices of the 2 assets over time, there is little point confirming
what we already know. This is that the Betfair market led the pound market
and that a portfolio of selling the pound and buying the Betfair contract (i.e.
selling the error term) would be profitable. There are known trades in the
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Figure 9: Sample Auto Correlation Function of the Error.
market at around 4 am that would have made roughly 9 cents of profit per
£1 of the pound sold, or an unleveraged return of up to 7% in about two
hours13. Supporters of the EMH could object to the conclusion that the
EMH fails by simply selling the pound uncovered due to the increased risk
an investor would be being exposed to (the pound, after all, was exceptionally
volatile during the period). However, the arbitrage strategy of covering the
short with a position in the spread bet largely eliminates risk. The arbitrage
suggests that failure of the EMH in its weak form is not reliant on the forecast
model predictions.
13In terms of transaction costs, selling the pound would cost about 2-3 hundredths of
a cent at that time, whereas the Betfair cost is 3 − 5% levied on any bets that pay out.
This would slightly change the ratio of the portfolio but not significantly affect profits or
these conclusions.
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7 Conclusion
This paper examined the efficiency of the Betfair and pound/dollar markets
as the results of the United Kingdom European Union membership referen-
dum were announced. This event provided a unique opportunity to study the
interaction between a flow of information, a prediction market and a financial
market, where there was a sole, public determinant of prices. Other work
has identified the pound market as being inefficient during the period under
investigation but we were able to answer questions about the efficiency of
the prediction market as well as the relative speed at which the two markets
digested the information flow.
We have presented a rigorous Bayesian real-time model of the probability
of Brexit for the period under consideration. This is based on a copula that
is not constrained to normal distributions. The Bayesian method improves
upon earlier estimation methods as it does not rely on any asymptotic prop-
erties of estimators for small samples. The conclusions of the model are as
follows:
1. Not only was the currency market informationally inefficient so too
36
was the betting market, and both markets violated semi-strong EMH
on the night of the vote.
2. The betting market, although inefficient, was more efficient than the
currency market. The betting market took less than 2 hours to reflect
the information contained in the vote whereas the currency market took
over 3 hours.
3. The mispricing is inconsistent with any plausible prior and flow of in-
formation. Specifically, an assumption of consistent behaviour implies
a simply unbelievable prior belief (very close to perfect independence
of the results of different voting areas).
We also present a close to risk-free arbitrage opportunity in the two markets.
The arbitrage result suggests that a violation of EMH in the weak form
has occurred. The conclusion that there is a failure of the weak form of
the hypothesis is not reliant on any flow of fundamental information or the
electoral probability model.
Our results suggest that market participants suffered a behavioural bias as
the results unfolded. It appears that traders and gamblers simply could not
believe that the UK was voting to leave the EU. Further, it appears that on
this occasion the betting market, although slow, adjusted much more quickly
than the financial markets. Any future possible UK referendum on this
subject will present an opportunity to study whether this inefficiency persists
or whether efficient behaviour is exhibited, possibly due to the publication of
this and other studies. If an inefficiency were to persist it would be interesting
to observe whether the betting markets again lead the financial markets.
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A Model summary
A.1 Variables
pi, qi, si : Voting area vote percentage, turnout and size, order by time of
announcement
pn, µN , σ
2
i : National vote share, mean and variance for Brexit
µpi : Expectation of pi
µH : Vector of expectations provided by Hanretty study
σ2pi : Marginal variance of pi
υi : Expectation of qi
σ2υ : Marginal variance of qi, independent of i
P0 : Betfair implied prior probability of Brexit
r : Vector of variables = (p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn)
⊺
r˜ : Re-ordered vector by time of announcement= (p1, q1, . . . , pn, qn)
⊺
Fi, F˜i : Marginal CDFs of i’th components of r and r˜
ρθ, ρφ : Inter-area prior vote share and turnout correlation
ρθφ : Intra-area prior vote and turnout correlation
Σ0 : Covariance matrix of copula prior
Σ˜0 : Covariance matrix of copula prior with sequentially reordered
rows and columns
Π˜ : Mean of prior after the announcement of m results
Σ˜ : Covariance matrix of prior after the announcement of m results
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A.2 Prior Probability of Brexit
P (BREXIT)0 = P
(∑
i
piqisi∑
i
qisi
> 1
2
)
Φ−1(F1(r1)), . . . , Φ−1(F2n(r2n)) ∼ N(0,Σ0)
Σ0 =
(
Σp Σpq
ΣTpq Σq
)
Σp = (1− ρp) In + (ρp) ini
′
n
Σq = (1− ρq) In + (ρq) ini
′
n
Σpq = ρpq × [(1− (ρqρp)) In + (ρqρp)ini
′
n]
A.3 Prior Marginal Calibration
µp = µH + αN × i
σ2pi = (σ
2
H)i + σ
2
N
σ2N , αN : E(pN) = µN , P0 = P (BREXIT)0 (EMH) or σ = σˆ
2
N (FORECAST)
A.4 Update
Σ˜0 =
(
Σ˜m,m Σ˜m, 6m
Σ˜6m,m Σ˜6m, 6m
)
x˜m = (Fp1(p1), Fq1(q1), . . . , Fpm(pm), Fpm(qm))
′
Π˜6m = Σ˜6m,mΣ˜−1m,mx˜m
Σ˜6m = Σ˜6m, 6m − Σ˜6m,mΣ˜−1m,mΣ˜m, 6m
P (BREXIT)m = P
(∑
i>m
piqisi∑
i
qisi
> 1
2
−
∑
i≤m piqisi∑
i
qisi
)
Φ−1(F˜2m+1(r˜2m+1)), . . . , Φ−1(F˜2n(r˜2n))|x˜m ∼ N(Π˜6m, Σ˜6m)
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B Review of Probability Model in Wu et al.
(2017)
The model under consideration in Wu et al. (2017) performs (in the one
factor case) the following Weighted Least Squares regression following the
announcement of k results
pi = αµi + β + ǫi, ǫi ∼ N(0, σ
2
ǫ ) i = 1, . . . , k.
The national vote share and thus the probability of Brexit is then simu-
lated by generating M realisations and evaluating the relevant sum. A correct
application of this method would involve sampling unknowns (α, β, σ2ǫ ) from
the joint distribution
N
((
αˆ
βˆ
)
,
(
σˆ2α ραβσˆασˆβ
ραβ σˆασˆβ σˆ
2
β
))
, χ2(k − 2),
where the slope and the intercept from linear regression are mutually cor-
related. Then the correct covariance and variance of unannounced results
would be:
cov(pi, pj) = E(α,β,σ2ǫ )
[
cov(pi, pj|α, β, σ
2
ǫ )
]
+ cov(α,β,σ2ǫ )
[
E(pi|α, β, σ
2
ǫ ), E(pj|α, β, σ
2
ǫ )
]
= cov(α,β,σ2ǫ ) [αµi + β, αµj + β]
= µiµjσˆ
2
α + σˆ
2
β + [(µi + µj)ραβ σˆασˆβ ]
var(pi) = σˆ
2
ǫ + µiµjσˆ
2
α + σˆ
2
β + [(µi + µj)ραβ σˆασˆβ ] . (B.1)
However, an assumption that αˆ and βˆ are uncorrelated appears to be
used when in fact they are close to being perfectly anti-correlated with14
ραβ =
−
∑k
1 µi√
n
∑k
1 µ
2
i
= −
µ¯√
µ¯2
≈ −1.
The calculation in Wu et al. (2017) would thus be calculating the variance
structure of the unknown referendum results as:
cov(pi, pj) = µiµjσˆ
2
α + σˆ
2
β
var(pi) = σ
2
ǫ + µiµjσˆ
2
α + σˆ
2
β ,
14A simulation of their results yielded ραβ ∈ (−0.97,−1).
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which is different to the values in equation B.1.
Another issue with the method is that the assumption of a normal distri-
bution for (αˆ, βˆ) with correctly specified errors is highly questionable, par-
ticularly in small samples. (αˆ, βˆ) only follows such a distribution in finite
samples if the errors are normal, and if not, it would be biased but consistent.
The normal distribution is an asymptotic result for non-normal errors, and
even then a correct evaluation assumes no heteroskedasticity; otherwise error
estimates are likely to be too low and implied probabilities of Brexit to be
too confident. This could be overcome using robust errors, but only for large
datasets. Using robust errors in small samples can produce severely biased
estimators.
The model in Wu et al. (2017) and that presented in this paper use
different approaches to estimate the covariance structure of the conditional
distributions used to form predictions. That of Wu et al. (2017) requires no
prior (beyond expectations) and attempts to infer the covariance structure
from an OLS regression of results announced so far. Our model, by contrast,
starts with a prior for the covariance structure and updates that prior as re-
sults come in. Both methods will produce the same covariance and results in
larger samples but will be different for small samples. The different approach
is illustrative of the differences between a Frequentist and Bayesian approach
to inference. However, we suggest that the Frequentist approach presented
in Wu et al. (2017) is not appropriate for the small numbers of results avail-
able at the times of predictions (<20 results). More sophisticated corrections
for small sampling estimation would be desirable. We believe our Bayesian
approach is a more suitable way to proceed in the case of this application.
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